The importance of having legal representation in court cannot be overstated. Today, associate attorney Melissa Kujda was awarded a default judgment against a landlord who tried to sue one of our clients. Every aspect of the landlord’s complaint was frivolous – the landlord was seeking rent that our client already paid, and the total amount of rent claimed was over 10 times that stipulated in the lease. The list goes on.

In fact, after rendering a default judgment, the judge awarded attorney’s fees after finding that the lawsuit was brought in bad faith and without substantial justification, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341.

It turns out that, during the past few years, this particular landlord has filed 10 separate lawsuits in the District Court of Baltimore City alone. Five of those lawsuits were uncontested – the defendants, presumably other tenants, were not represented by counsel and failed to come to court to fight the landlord’s claims. As a result, the landlord was awarded default judgments in each of those cases, amounting to thousands of dollars over the years.

Unfortunately, this is a tactic commonly employed by landlords in Baltimore City. Our firm has every reason to believe that, in our case, the landlord did not expect our client to fight the claims. The landlord filed the lawsuit expecting to obtain another easy default judgment from another unrepresented tenant.
The prospect that, without legal representation, our client could have been found liable for fraudulent damages is extremely unsettling, and it underscores the importance of obtaining legal representation to help fight your case.

In a published opinion, the Fourth Circuit found that the lower court was wrong when it counted the defendant’s prior conviction for second degree assault as a “crime of violence.”
For some time, Maryland’s second degree assault statute has caused confusion in federal court. The Government inevitably argues that second degree assault must be a crime of violence, even though this is not always the case. The reality, as the Fourth Circuit has made clear, is that second degree assault can go either way. It can be violent or it can be non-violent.
If the Court is to count second degree assault as a violent conviction, the Government must prove that the assault is the violent type. However, there are limited ways in which the Government may do so.
In U.S. v. Donnell, the lower court improperly reached the conclusion that the second degree assault conviction was “violent” by using the police officer’s statement of probable cause. But, as the Fourth Circuit clarified, the defendant did not plea guilty to the officer’s statement of probable cause, and did not necessarily admit that those facts were true. Therefore, the court could not use those facts to make a determination of whether the crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty was “violent.”
The lesson of this case: When the Government attempts to enhance a federal sentence by using a Maryland second degree assault conviction, it is the duty of the defense to challenge this type of enhancement. Sure, the Government may prevail in some cases, but they must be held to their burden of proof.

The Fourth Circuit has long been among the most conservative, pro-Government, anti-defendant circuits in the country. That may be slowly changing, however, with the appointment of progressive judges like Andre Davis.
In a recent opinion, in US v. Massenburg, Judge Davis wrote for a panel that reversed a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion. The Fourth Circuit held that the knowledge of one police officer could not be imputed to another officer when the second officer was making an arrest.
Massenburg was searched by a police officer and found to have been in possession of a gun. The Government argued that probable cause existed for the search because another officer had seen a bulge in the suspect’s pocket. However, the officer who saw the bulge never conveyed that information to the officer who conducted the search (and who eventually found the gun). The district court ruled that the information regarding the bulge could be imputed to the arresting officer — even though the arresting officer had no clue about the bulge.
The Fourth Circuit opinion rejected this logic, saying it was only the knowledge of the arresting officer that mattered for purposes of establishing probable cause. This ruling went against other circuits, and seems ripe for Supreme Court consideration.
Although this case applies only in very limited circumstances, it is a good sign that the Fourth Circuit is becoming more even-handed in how it considers suppression issues related to criminal defendants. Kudos to Judge Davis!
(For the sake of full disclosure, I clerked for Judge Davis at the District Court of Maryland).

After winning a state court post-conviction, and obtaining a new sentencing, a white collar client of the Law Office of C. Justin Brown was granted additional relief by a Circuit Court judge this week.
The Circuit Court Judge reduced the client’s sentence to a new term that should allow the client to get home by Christmas.
The Firm raised numerous issues on post-conviction, but ultimately the winning issue was the failure of trial counsel to properly calculate the defendant’s state sentencing guidelines. Although these are advisory guidelines, the trial court judge clearly attempted to sentence within this range. But, because he was misinformed about the proper guidelines range, and defense counsel failed to correct the error, the judge ended up sentencing the defendant in a significantly higher range.
The Firm’s success was largely due to extensive research and investigation into the client’s criminal history. The Firm was able to prove that the client’s convictions in another state were not as severe as they were purported to be in his pre-sentence investigation report. This error was enough to force the State to capitulate and agree to a new sentencing proceeding.
At the new sentencing, which was strenuously contested by the State, Brown presented the Court with the proper guidelines range, as well as mitigating evidence. The Judge then granted a reduced sentence.

The Court of Appeals has just made an important Post-Conviction ruling, in Savoy v. State. The Court granted a new trial on the grounds that the trial court judge had given an erroneous “reasonable doubt” jury instruction.
Despite some procedural idiosyncracies, the case is a reminder of just how potent the reasonable doubt issue can be in cases in which the judge gave a flawed instruction.
In Savoy, the trial court gave the following instruction:
“After the jury has fairly and carefully reviewed all the evidence in this case,
if you feel that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
and to a moral certainty all of the evidence necessary to convict, then you
must acquit the defendant.
The test of reasonable doubt is that the evidence that the State has produced
must be so convincing that it would enable you to act on an important piece of
business in your every day life. The words “to a moral certainty” do not
mean an absolute or mathematical certainty but a certainty based upon
convincing grounds of probability. The phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt”
does not mean beyond any doubt or all possible doubt. But as the words
indicate, beyond a doubt that is reasonable.”
The Court found that the instruction had the effect of lowering the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard.
Even though there was no objection to the instruction at trial, and the issue was not raised on appeal, it was successfully resuscitated on post-conviction.
Critical to the success of the petitioner was the fact that the State conceded that the instruction was erroneous.
Any person considering a post-conviction should have their attorney carefully review their jury instructions to see if Savoy v. State is applicable.

It has been more than five years since the Supreme Court, in United States v. Booker, held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory. Judges have been gradually taking that to heart.
In the recent sentencing of one of my clients in Baltimore, a Federal Judge ruled that, despite the clear language of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, she would not sentence my client as a career offender. The Judge held that such a designation, even though mandated by the Guidelines, was unfair and nonsensical — and therefore she would not apply it.
It was a courageous decision by the judge. For the client, charged with Hobbs Act Robbery, it meant that, instead of a sentence exceeding 10 years, she received a sentence of only 27 months.

A recent Supreme Court opinion, Fowler v. United States, issues of a firm rebuke of the Fourth Circuit’s position on the Federal Witness Tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). The Fourth Circuit had been allowing the Government to successfully charge federal witness tampering even in cases in which there was no apparent connection to a “federal offense.” Now, according to SCOTUS, the statute must be interpreted as… well, as it is actually written. That is, “the Government must show that there was a reasonable likelihood that a relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer.”
Although this ruling may not affect a huge number of cases, it is symbolically important because it tightens the reigns on some instances of Government overreaching — ie when the Government brings cases in federal court that really belong in state court.